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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PLAINTIFFS STATEMENT OF FACT WAS NOT DISPUTED 
OR CONTRADICTED 
EVIDENCE 
ARGUMENTS 
AND 
OF 
IS 
BY DEFENDANT' S TESTIMONY 
COMPLETELY SUPPORTIVE 
PLAINTIFF CONTAINED IN THE 
OF 
BRIEF 
OR 
THE 
OF 
APPELLEE AND CROSS-APPELLANT 
The Defendant asserts in her reply brief that the Plaintiff's 
statement of facts contained errors and misstatements. It is true 
that the term "commissions" should not have been used and the term 
"bonus" should have been used, but other than that 
mischaracterization of income, there have been no factual 
misstatements or errors in the statements of fact as contained in 
the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant. In each instance, 
throughout the statement of facts, the Plaintiff has cited to the 
transcript of trial and cited to the testimony of the Defendant, 
also in the transcript of trial. 
The Defendant has brought to the Court's attention issues 
relating to the income of the Plaintiff. It was stipulated at the 
time of trial and undisputed that the 1992 income received by the 
Plaintiff was $114,500.00, which included a substantial bonus of 
$14,500.00. (See TR, p. 18, 11. 21-32; TR, p. 21, 11. 18-24.) The 
Plaintiff's bonus received was included in his monthly gross income 
for the purposes of calculating both child support and alimony. 
Nowhere in the transcript of trial did the Defendant attempt to 
assert that the income as set forth by Plaintiff in his statement 
of facts was other than his correct and true income. 
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Again, the Defendant's characterization of Plaintiff's 
statements as being misleading and contrary to testimony is 
inappropriate and incorrect. As cited in the facts of the case in 
the Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant, the Plaintiff testified 
that Defendant worked at different jobs during the marriage. (TR, 
p. 19, 11. 4-8.) The Plaintiff specifically referred to a period 
of two years from 1988 through 1990 that the Defendant ran a day 
care center from the parties' home. None of the testimony of the 
Defendant disputed that; and, in fact, confirmed Plaintiff's 
testimony. (See TR, p. 154, 11. 5-18.) 
The Defendant has attempted to attack Plaintiff's statements 
regarding his agreeability to paying for private schooling. It is 
clear from the transcript of trial and the testimony of the 
Plaintiff, that he believed that the payment of child support on 
his part to Defendant in the sum of $1,361.00 would be adeguate to 
meet the needs of the children, including the cost of private 
school. (TR, pp. 22-23.) That in itself disputes that he agreed to 
pay for private schooling of the children. 
Lastly, the Plaintiff's statement that the ReadiAccess loan 
and tax liability that he listed as marital debts is disputed by 
the record is completely incorrect. The Plaintiff testified that 
during the later stages of the parties' separation, the Defendant 
ran up a number of expenses reguiring that Plaintiff take out a 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
loan for $7,500.00 in order to pay off those expenses. He also 
testified that he had an income tax obligation of approximately 
$4,300.00, which was accrued during the period of the parties7 
marriage. (See TR, p. 32, 11. 2-11.) The Plaintiff specifically 
stated that the overdraft account or loan was a debt incurred to 
pay for the expenses of the Defendant and was incurred during the 
marriage and that the account was opened to cover the expenses that 
were incurred during the marriage. (See TR, p. 32, 11. 21-35, p. 
33, 11. 1-7.) 
There is absolutely no evidence that the Plaintiff raided or 
closed bank accounts and used funds for his own use and benefit and 
the allegations of the Defendant otherwise, were not supported by 
the evidence. It is clear that the Defendant has not appealed any 
decision of the trial court relating to "reimbursement" to 
Defendant of any funds that Defendant perceives Plaintiff absconded 
with from the joint marital assets. Again, therefore, the 
Defendant's statements regarding the Plaintiff's handling of the 
finances really does misconstrue the facts as set forth at the time 
of trial as contained in the transcript of trial. 
II. PLAINTIFF AT NO TIME AGREED TO PAY THE COST OF 
PRIVATE SCHOOLING FOR THE MINOR CHILDREN AND IT WAS 
AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION TO MAKE THE AWARD IN 
ADDITION TO BASE SUPPORT. 
The Defendant is asserting in the Defendant's reply brief that 
the Plaintiff agreed, before the separation and after the 
3 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
separation, to pay the costs of private schooling. The Defendant 
has asserted that the Plaintiff agreed to share the cost after 
separation to the time of trial. However, the Defendant has 
provided no evidence of the same. In fact, no evidence of the same 
exists. The outstanding court order regarding temporary relief 
ordered the Plaintiff to pay child support, only, and day care and 
made no specific orders regarding the payment of the cost of 
private school. A copy of that order, which governed the behavior 
of the parties pending trial on this matter is appended hereto as 
Addendum "A". That Order and Restraining Order, which entered all 
orders relating to the payment of support and/or private school, 
states in paragraph 9 that the Plaintiff would pay child support of 
$1,169.00 and one-half of any work or educated related child care 
costs. Again, there was no order in place ordering that Plaintiff 
bear the expense of a private school. 
The Defendant has stated in her reply brief that the Uniform 
Child Support Act contained in §78-45-7, et seq., is adjusted for 
taxes and the claiming of tax exemptions. However, the Defendant 
cites no support for that assertion. In addition, the Defendant 
has attempted to state that since Plaintiff was awarded the tax 
exemption that somehow gave the court authority to deviate from the 
guidelines without setting forth the reasoning and basis for that 
4 
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deviation as required by the guidelines. (See Utah Code Annotated 
§78-45-7.2.) 
The Defendant's argument that since child care expenses and 
uninsured medical and dental expenses are not included in the base 
child support guidelines, that private school expenses are also a 
separate issue is nonsensical. If our legislature believed that 
the private school cost was a separate issue that needed to be 
addressed by it and was not contained within the base support, it 
would make sense that there would be a specific statute as there is 
with child care expenses and uninsured medical and dental expenses. 
III. THE PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL TO THE COURT'S DENIAL OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE THE STIPULATION TO 
CUSTODY MAY BE MOOT. 
Plaintiff has argued in his Brief of Appellee and Cross-
Appellant that the court erred or abused its discretion in denying 
Plaintiff's Motion to Set Aside the Stipulation in Re: Child 
Custody. The Plaintiff believes that the arguments and reasoning 
set forth in his Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellant adequately 
address that issue. 
However, commencing with November, 1992, the minor children 
have been in the physical care and custody of the Plaintiff and his 
spouse, Merrilee Caldwell, pursuant to an order of temporary 
custody, and they remain in his temporary care and custody as of 
5 
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the date of this response. Therefore, the Court may deem that 
issue moot. 
CONCLUSION 
The relief sought by the Plaintiff on his cross-appeal seeks 
an order from this Court reversing the requirement that Plaintiff 
pay one-half of the cost of private schooling and reversing the 
court's order requiring him to maintain life insurance naming the 
Defendant as beneficiary. Further, Plaintiff asks that the Court 
affirm the trial court's determination regarding alimony and 
attorney's fees. Given the physical custody of the minor children 
with the Plaintiff, however, the Plaintiff withdraws his request 
that the Court remand any issues to the trial court, particularly 
relating to the best interests of the minor children, as that issue 
is currently before the Court. Further, the Plaintiff respectfully 
requests that each party be responsible for his or her own court 
costs and attorney's fees on appeal. 
6 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* 
MARCUS P. RANDOLPH, 
* ORDER AND RESTRAINING ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
* Civil No. 914902308 DA 
vs. 
* Judge Sawaya 
MARY E. RANDOLPH, 
* 
Defendant. 
Hearing on Plaintiff's Motion for Temporary Relief and 
Restraining Order and the Cross Motion for Temporary Relief of the 
Defendant, was held at a regular term of the above entitled Court, 
pursuant to notice, July 18, 1991, before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. The Motion of the Plaintiff 
for authorization to close sale of residence and to sell 
automobile, together with the Temporary Restraining Order of the 
Defendant was heard at a regular term of the above entitled Court, 
pursuant to notice on August 14, 1991 before Domestic Relations 
Commissioner, Thomas N. Arnett, Jr. Plaintiff appeared at both 
1 
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Hettinger. Defendant appeared in person at both hearings and was 
represented by her attorney, E. H. Fankhauser. The issues were 
argued to the Court by proffer and submitted to the Commissioner 
for recommendation. The Commissioner, having recommended approval 
of the matters stipulated to by the parties through their 
respective counsel, and having taken the contested matters and 
issues under advisement; and the Commissioner, having reviewed the 
pleadings, respective Motions and Affidavits of the parties on file 
herein, and being fully advised in the premises, made the following 
recommendations: 
1. By stipulation of the parties the marital home and 
residence be sold and the net proceeds divided equally, except that 
the Plaintiff is to pay $2,900.00 toward the roof replacement 
and/or repairs from his share of the proceeds. 
2. That Plaintiff may have the possession and use of the 1972 
Porsche automobile and Defendant is awarded the exclusive temporary 
possession and use of the 1988 Dodge Caravan during the pendency of 
this action. Plaintiff shall have the right to sell the 1972 
Porsche automobile during the pendency of this action on condition 
that he provide a complete accounting of the sale of said vehicle 
to the Defendant, through counsel. 
3. Plaintiff is to pay to the Defendant the sum of $1,500.00 
advance on support obligation, which sum is to be credited against 
any temporary child support or alimony awarded Defendant. 
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5. Plaintiff is to continue to maintain his health and 
accident insurance coverage for the benefit of the Defendant and 
the minor children of the parties during the pendency of this 
action. In that Defendant is currently a student with no income, 
the Plaintiff should be ordered to pay any medical or dental 
expenses incurred for the benefit of the minor children which is 
not paid by insurance. 
6. Plaintiff is to maintain his present life insurance 
coverage on his life in force during the pendency of this action 
without change of beneficiary. Plaintiff is to notify Defendant of 
any recent changes of beneficiary. 
7. A mutual Restraining Order is to issue that neither party 
is to harass, annoy, touch, harm or injure the other and further 
that with the exception of the sale of the marital home and 1972 
Porsche automobile, neither party is to sell, encumber, dispose, 
transfer or otherwise dissipate any of the marital property or 
assets without mutual consent of the parties or order of the Court. 
8. The Commissioner finds that Defendant has been the primary 
caretaker of the minor children during the marriage. Defendant is 
currently unemployed and attending school and is therefore able to 
provide personal care rather than surrogate care for the minor 
3 
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temporary care, custody and control of the minor children and the 
Commissioner so recommends. The Plaintiff should be awarded 
liberal and reasonable visitation rights with the minor children. 
Should the parties be unable to agree, then visitation should be 
interpreted in accordance with the Court's standard schedule. Each 
party should be ordered to provide the other party with a current 
residence address and phone number. 
9. Child support should be based on Plaintiff's current gross 
monthly income of $7,125.00 per month and zero (0) income for 
Defendant, resulting in a child support obligation of $1,169.00 per 
month. Plaintiff should also be ordered to pay one-half (1/2) of 
any work or education related child care costs actually incurred by 
Defendant. Child support and work related or education child care 
costs are to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month and 1/2 
on or before the 20th of the month commencing with July 20, 1991. 
10. The Commissioner finds that Defendant is in need of 
temporary alimony during the pendency of this action. The 
Commissioner finds that Defendant's monthly living expenses are 
inflated and over stated by approximately one-third. Therefore, 
the Plaintiff should pay temporary alimony to Defendant in the sum 
of $1,000.00 per month. Alimony is to be payable with the child 
support and child care costs, 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month 
and 1/2 on or before the 2 0th of the month commencing July 20, 
4 
OOOOflO 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
11. In that Defendant is currently a student with no income, 
the Plaintiff should be ordered to assume and pay any marital 
indebtedness incurred prior to the filing of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
12. Each party expects to receive in excess of $20,000.00 at 
the closing on the sale of the marital home and it appears fair and 
equitable that each party should pay 1/2 of the moving expenses, 
with a final determination of apportionment of these expenses to be 
made at the time of trial or settlement. 
Pursuant to Article 4, "DOMESTIC RELATIONS" Section 
6-4 01(2) (E) , Utah Code of Judicial Administration, each party shall 
have ten (10) days of the date of the recommended Order made by 
Minute Entry to file written objections thereto; and further, the 
recommendations of the Commissioner shall be in effect as an Order 
until such time as the Court modifies or changes an Order, now, 
therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED AS FOLLOWS: 
1. Defendant be and is hereby awarded the temporary care, 
custody and control of the two (2) minor children of the parties, 
to-wit: KIRA, age 9 and ERIKA, age 5, during the pendency of this 
action, subject to the right of Plaintiff to visit with the 
children at reasonable times and places. If the parties cannot 
agree on visitation, then visitation should be interpreted in 
accordance with the Court's standard schedule. 
2. Each party is ordered to provide the other with a current 
5 
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residence address and telephone number during the pendency of this 
action. 
3. Plaintiff be and is hereby ordered to pay to Plaintiff as 
temporary child support the sum of $lf169.00 per month. Plaintiff 
is ordered to pay 1/2 of any work or education related child care 
costs actually incurred by Defendant during the pendency of this 
action. Child support and work or education related child care 
costs are to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month and 1/2 
on or before 20th of the month commencing July 20, 1991. 
4. Plaintiff is ordered to pay to Defendant as temporary 
alimony during the pendency of this action the sum of $1,000,00 per 
month. Alimony is to be paid 1/2 on or before the 5th of the month 
and 1/2 on or before the 20th of the month commencing July 20, 
1991. 
5. The marital home of the parties is to be sold and the 
proceeds divided equally except that Plaintiff is to pay $2,900.00 
toward roof replacement and/or repairs from his share of the 
proceeds. 
6. Plaintiff is awarded the exclusive possession and use of 
the 1972 Porsche automobile during the pendency of this action. 
Plaintiff is given the option to sell this vehicle and provide an 
accounting to Defendant of the sale proceeds. 
"7. Defendant is awarded the exclusive possession and use of 
the 1988 Dodge Caravan during the pendency of this action. 
8. Plaintiff is to provide to Defendant $1,500.00 as an 
6 
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advance on the support obligation to be paid by the Plaintiff to 
Defendant which is to be credited against the child support and/or 
alimony awarded Defendant. 
9. The parties are to divide the personal property between 
them when moving and provide inventories to the other party. Any 
item of personal property in dispute should be placed in storage 
until the parties can agree or until further order of the Court. 
10. Plaintiff is to maintain health and accident insurance 
coverage for the Defendant and the minor children during the 
pendency of this action, and is ordered to pay all hospital, 
medical, dental, orthodontia and optical expenses of the minor 
children not paid by insurance. 
11. Plaintiff is ordered to assume and pay all marital 
indebtedness incurred prior to the filing of Plaintiff fs Complaint. 
12. Each party is to be responsible to pay 1/2 of the moving 
expenses, with the final determination of apportionment of these 
expenses to be made at the time of trial or settlement of this 
case. 
13. Each party is hereby restrained from annoying, harassing, 
touching, harming, or injTiring the other and from interfering with 
the other during the pendency of this action at their place of 
-residence or at any other time and place. Further, with exception 
-of sale of the marital home and the 1972 Porsche, neither party is 
to sell, encumber, transfer, dispose or otherwise dissipate any of 
the marital property during the pendency of this action without the 
7 
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mutual consent of both parties or order pf the Court. 
DATED this ^ day of , 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
JAJfES S. SAWAYA 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
Approved: 
[£& <££. <_ 5" LL 
THOMAS N. ARNETT, JR. 
DOMESTIC RELATIONS(COMMISSIONER |^4 °i\ 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed 
to H. Russell Hettinger, Attorney for Plaintiff, 800 Kennecott 
Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84133 pursuant to Rule 4-504(2), 
Code of Judicial Administration, on this rZ/fl*~ day of August, 
1991. 
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